1
Stephan F. Gohmann, PhD 2 and James E. McClure, PhD
The timing of retirement is affected by a wide range of influences. Certainly, one very important factor bearing on a worker's decision about when to retire is the size of the pension benefit he or she can expect to receive upon retirement.
Pension plans may be classified as either defined benefit or defined contribution plans. A defined contribution plan provides for a fixed rate of contribution. Each worker has an individual account upon which his benefits are based. A typical benefit is calculated as some function of the current value of his contributions. According to the U.S. Department of Labor (1983) , plans of this type accounted for 72% of all pension plans in 1978, but covered only 31 % of all workers.
Unlike a defined contribution plan, a defined benefit plan does not base the worker's benefits on his or her individual account. Instead, benefits are usually based on some function of earnings and years of service. In defined benefit plans, contributions are typically actuarially determined on the basis of the worker's expected benefits. Although only 28% of all pension plans are defined benefit plans, 69% of all workers covered by pensions are in these plans.
Both defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans have been affected by two Supreme Court decisions regarding the use of gender as a classification for setting the size of benefits and contributions. The economic logic of using gender as a classification variable stems from the difference in the average age of death of men and women. If individual lifetimes were known prior to the individual's death, benefits and contributions could be adjusted so that each person in a pension fund would receive the same rate of return on his pension contri-butions. Using gender as a proxy for length of life allows benefits and contributions to be set so that the average man and average woman receive equal pension wealth. Even though it seems economically logical to use gender as a classification variable, the Supreme Court has ruled that it is illegal to do so.
In 1978, the Court applied Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in reaching its decision in City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, v. Marie Manhart. In this case, the Court ruled that employers could not require women to make larger contributions to a pension plan in order to receive the same benefits as similarly situated men. In Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Nathalie Norris (1983) , the Court subsequently extended its application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as it related to the use of gender as a classification variable in pension plans. The Court ruled that it was unlawful for Arizona to offer its employees the option "of receiving retirement benefits from one of several companies selected by it, all of which paid women lower monthly benefits than men who had made the same contributions." This case is quite similar to the 1978 Manhart case because in order to receive the same benefits as similarly situated men, Norris would have been required by Arizona to make larger contributions.
As a result of the two court rulings, gender may no longer be used as a classification variable in determining either the contributions or benefits in an employer-offered pension plan. Thus, the use of sexbased mortality tables to set employees' pension benefits and contributions is now unlawful. Although these rulings are not retroactive, they will affect how defined benefit and defined contribution pensions are structured in the future.
Pension plans often offer a life annuity option under which the worker is entitled to a stream of pension benefits extending throughout retirement until the worker's death. Workers find this option attractive because they do not have to estimate their time of death. Defined contribution plans can no longer offer a life annuity option which pays a benefit stream adjusted by gender. If a life annuity is offered by an employer, the law now requires that men and women receive the same per period benefit per dollar contributed. Defined benefit plans are also affected by the Supreme Court's rulings because the contributions made to them are usually determined using sex-based mortality tables. Contributions made to these plans can no longer be smaller for men who receive the same per period benefits as women.
Although many alternative plans might be used by firms seeking to comply with the Court's rulings, the focus here is on pension plans that offer the worker a life annuity with gender neutral payments calculated from unisex mortality tables. The move to unisex plans, from the now illegal sex-based life annuity plans, differentially affects the benefits paid to men and women. There has been much debate regarding the effect of unisex plans on the pension wealth of married and single men and women. For example, Kulash (1983) indicated that married men will most likely realize an increase in pension wealth relative to married women. Burkhauser (1984) pointed out that single men will be the most substantial losers and married men the most substantial winners. There is, however, general agreement that single men will receive a decrease in pension wealth and single women will receive an increase in pension wealth.
Determined in this paper is how the implementation of a unisex plan affects the pension wealth and retirement ages of single men and women. The analysis also applies to married pensioners enrolled in pension funds that do not offer joint-and-survivorship options. The effect of the Court's rulings on the retirement decisions of married workers enrolled in pension plans that offer joint-and-survivorship options has been left for future research. It is likely that the retirement results for married women taking such options will be similar to the results for single men because these women, like single men, will receive reduced benefits. Similarly, the results for married men taking these options are likely to correspond to the results for single women.
The next section contains an explanation of how the adoption of a unisex plan affects the pension wealth of single people and applies this explanation to the TIAA-CREF retirement plan. Then there is a discussion of how a change to unisex plans affects the age of retirement. Next there is an estimation of the effect that implementation of a unisex plan has on the probability of labor force participation.
Pension Benefits, Pension Wealth, and The Single Worker's Net Wage Sex-based pension plans can be differentiated from unisex plans on the basis of pension benefits, pension wealth, and the net wage accruing to workers. The worker's retirement decision is determined by the simultaneous consideration of these components.
Pension Benefits and Pension Wealth
The primary difference between the sex-based pension plan and the unisex pension plan is that the former pays unequal per period benefits but assures both men and women equal pension wealth, whereas the latter assures men and women equal per period benefits but yields unequal pension wealth. (Pension wealth is the present value of pension benefits.) The method by which benefits are calculated is the reason behind this difference.
The per period benefit is calculated distinctly for men and women in a sex-based pension plan. Separate life expectancy tables are used to calculate men's and women's benefits. To assure equal pension wealth to all pensioners, a sex-based plan must either pay smaller per period benefits for equal contributions or assess higher contributions for equal benefits to those who are expected to live longer. Women, on average, outlive men. Sex-based pension plans, therefore, generally pay women a smaller per period benefit than men or charge them higher contribution rates for the same benefit level.
In contrast, a single unisex life table is used to calculate life expectancies for the pension cohort as a whole in a unisex pension plan. This table is used to calculate the equal (by sex) per period benefits based on the average life expectancy of the pension cohort. Because women, on average, outlive men, they will receive a greater number of these equal per period benefits and will therefore have a greater pension wealth than men.
To illustrate the difference between a sex-based and a unisex plan consider the following simple example. Suppose a defined contribution plan pension cohort consists of only 2 individuals, a male named Mark and a female named Marie. Assume that they are the same in every way except that, at retirement, Mark has 1 year to live and Marie has 2 years to live. Further, suppose that both have made $100 in pension contributions over their lifetime and that the rate of interest is zero. In a sex-based pension plan, the life annuity benefit stream to Mark would consist of one payment of $100. The payments to Marie in the sex-based plan would be two payments of $50 each. From this example, it can be seen that the sexbased plan pays both Mark and Marie an equal pension wealth of $100, but pays them unequal pension benefits per period. Now suppose that Mark and Marie are enrolled in a unisex plan that pays them equal per period benefits. If, as above, Mark and Marie have made pension contributions of $100 each, a total of $200 will be available for distribution when they retire. The unisex plan assures that all members of the cohort will receive the same per period benefit for equal contributions. For this to occur in the example, the pension pool must be divided into three equal parts. Mark gets one payment of $66.66 and then dies. Marie receives the remaining two payments of $66.66 each before she dies. Mark and Marie now receive equal per period benefits, but have unequal pension wealth. Mark's pension wealth under the unisex plan has fallen to $66.66 from the sex-based level of $100. Marie's pension wealth has increased under the unisex plan to $133.33 from the sex-based level of $100.
As the proportion of women in the pension plan increases, the difference between the sex-based and unisex plans is accentuated for men but diminished for women. In the confines of the example above an additional woman is added to the cohort. Call the new woman Nathalie and suppose that she differs from Marie in name only. Adding Nathalie to the cohort increases the proportion of women from one half to two thirds. Furthermore, Nathalie's entry into the cohort raises the pension contribution pool from $200 to $300. Recall that in the unisex plan, this pool must be distributed so that each person's per period benefit is equal. The pool must now be equally divided among the 2 women (each with 2 years of life remaining) and the 1 man (with 1 year of life). Thus, the pool is divided into five payments of $60 per year. Mark receives one payment of $60. Marie and Nathalie each receive two payments of $60. From this example it can be seen that as the proportion of women in the cohort increases, the pension benefits and pension wealth of the original cohort members, Mark and Marie, falls. Mark's wealth and benefits fell from $66.66 to $60. Marie's benefits fell from $66.66 to $60 and her wealth fell from $133.33 to $120. In the extreme case, when the cohort consists entirely of women, the benefit and wealth of this cohort of women is the same as in the sex-based plan. Men receive the same pension wealth and benefits per period in either the sex-based or unisex plan when the proportion of women is zero.
As illustrated by the simple example above, the implementation of the Supreme Court's ruling through a unisex plan will result in equal benefits for all members of the cohort, but will, on average, lead to a reduction in wealth for men and an increase in wealth for women. Obviously, these results do not hold for all men and women, and any person with a lower life expectancy will be adversely affected by being grouped with people with higher life expectancies regardless of sex. An adverse selection problem may occur if men have the option of substituting a lump sum cash benefit for the life annuity. Such an option would allow men to purchase a private annuity that would pay them a monthly benefit similar to a sex-based plan (larger than the benefit received from the unisex plan). If all men selected this option, the proportion of women in the pension cohort would be one and their benefits would be the same as their sex-based benefits.
It turns out that this adverse selection problem is counteracted by the current tax laws. IRS Code Section 457 says deferred compensation plans are taxable as ordinary income in the year they are received. Participants in such plans pay a much larger discounted tax bill for a lump sum payment than for a series of life annuity payments. For these plans, the tax laws effectively preclude the viability of lump sum payments and thus eliminate much of the adverse selection problem. Other benefit packages may offer a cafeteria-style selection of benefits which may also lead to adverse selection. These adverse selection considerations are more relevant to the long run. In the short run, workers are more likely to adjust their labor supply. Investigated here are these short-run labor supply effects, assuming no adverse selection.
To demonstrate how a unisex plan affects pension wealth and benefits empirically, the TIAA-CREF pension plan is used. In 1980, the TIAA-CREF pension fund paid men and women with a sex-based pension system. The fund promised minimum benefits at age 65 of $609/mo. for men and $530/mo. for women for each contribution of $10,000. At the time the life expectancies for 65 year-old men and women were 14.2 and 18.5 years, respectively. At an interest rate of 7.24%, the present value of these benefits is equal for men and women. The benefits that would have been paid by TIAA-CREF if a unisex plan had been used in 1980 have been calculated and are shown in Table 1 . When there are no men in the cohort, women get exactly their actuarially fair benefit as calculated by TIAA-CREF ($530/mo.). Note that as the proportion of women in the cohort fell, the size of the unisex benefit increased in value.
Shown in columns 3 and 4 of the table is the pension wealth for men and women in the TIAA-CREF plan of 1980 if a unisex plan is used. Under the unisex plan, women have higher wealth and men have lower wealth than in the sex-based pension plan. Also note that for the sex-based plans the present value of benefits for men and women are equal. Under a sex-based plan, men's benefits were calculated as if the proportion of women in the cohort was zero, p = 0. For women, the sex-based benefit was calculated as if the proportion of women in the cohort was one, p = 1. For these two cases pension wealth is $64,903.92. Thus, both could take equal lump sum payments upon retirement. Under the unisex plan, as the proportion of women in the cohort increased, the present value of benefits for men and women fell.
Shown in the final two columns in the table is the coefficient of actuarial fairness, c^, applicable to a person of sex i (i = w for women and i = m for men). The coefficient of actuarial fairness is defined as the ratio of present value benefits to present value contributions. When the present value of contributions equals the present value of benefits, a, = 1 and the plan is actuarially fair to the individual. If the present value of contributions is greater than the present value of benefits, then a,< 1 and the plan is less than actuarially fair. If a, > 1, the plan is more than actuarially fair. For men and women, a, increases as p falls. Note, however, that for the average woman in the unisex plan a w > 1, whereas for the average man a m < 1. It is shown in the next section that this difference in a.,, resulting from changes in p, differentially affects the retirement decisions of the average man and woman.
The coefficient of actuarial fairness can also be interpreted as a measure of the returns to pension contributions. In a fair plan a, = 1, so that every dollar of contributions is returned with interest to the pensioner in the form of future benefits. If a, > 1, every dollar of contributions returns more than a dollar in benefits to the worker. For example, as shown in Table 1 , if p = .2, then a w = 1.116. In this case, every dollar of contributions made by a woman results in a return in the present value of benefits of $1,116. Thus, women receive almost a 12% return above a normal return of 7.24% on every dollar they put into the plan. For men in this example, a m = 0.971, and every dollar of contributions returns $0.97 in benefits to men. Thus they receive a rate of return less than 7.24%.
The Worker's Net Wage
A worker's net wage is his current wage less his pension contributions plus the present value of the return on contributions in the form of future benefits. Under the sex-based plan the worker's net wage is quite easy to calculate because each dollar contributed results in a return of one dollar in the present value of future benefits. Thus, the net wage is exactly equal to the worker's current wage. For example, if the wage rate is $5.00 per hour and the pension contribution rate is 7% the worker receives $4.65 in his pay check per hour worked and contributes $.35 to the pension plan. Because he will receive an actuarially fair pension, however, he will receive $.35 in present value of benefits from his pension plan, which results in a net wage of $5.00 = [$5.00 -contributions + present value of benefits returned] = [5.00 -0.35 + 0.35]. Thus, an actuarially fair sexbased pension plan has no effect on the net wage.
Under the unisex plan the net wage is also calculated by the same method. Under the unisex plan, however, the present value of the return on contributions is not necessarily equal to the value of the contribution and, in fact, differs by sex. Thus, the net wage is different for men and women.
Recall from the TIAA-CREF example, that as long as the proportion of women is not zero (p > 0), then a m < 1, and each dollar of contributions by men returns less than a dollar of benefits in present value terms. Because <x m reflects the return on contributions it enters the net wage as follows: W n = W[1-@ + a m @] where @ is the contribution rate, W is the gross wage rate and W n is the net wage. Because under the unisex plan a m < 1, the net wage for men is less than their gross wage. For example, suppose the gross wage rate is $5.00, the contribution rate is 7% and for the cohort in this unisex pension plan a m = 0.7. In this case, each dollar of contributions resulted in a return of $0.70 in future benefits. The net wage for men is W n = $5.00[1 -.07 + (.7) (.07)] = $4.90. Thus, in this example, a change from a sex-based plan to a unisex plan resulted in a reduction of the net wage from $5.00 to $4.90.
Analogously, for women, the calculation of the net wage is W n = W[1 -0 + a w @]. The difference between the male net wage and the female net wage occurs because when p < 1, it follows that a m < 1 and a w > 1. This means that for women the net wage exceeds W whereas for men the net wage is less than W. For example, suppose that the women in a unisex pension cohort earn $5.00 per hour, have a contribution rate of 7%, and a w = 1.3. The female net wage in this case is W n = $5.00[1 -.07 + (1.3) (.07)] = $5.11. The net wage for women in this example has risen from the sex-based value of $5.00 to the unisex value of $5.11.
Theoretical Conclusions
Three implications of the unisex plan can be derived from the preceding discussion. First the change from a sex-based plan to a unisex plan reduces pension wealth for men and increases pension wealth for women, on average. Second, the movement from a sex-based plan to a unisex plan results in an increase in women's net wage and a decrease in men's net wage. Finally, as the proportion of women in the cohort changes, the size of these two effects changes. Working with these three theoretical conclusions the effect of a change to a unisex plan on the choice of retirement ages for men and women can be determined.
Retirement and Supreme Court Rulings
The effect of the Supreme Court Rulings on the age of retirement can be viewed through the effects of a change to a unisex plan through the parameter p. Before the rulings, the plans were actuarially fair to men and women, which implied a m = a w = 1. This meant that men in sex-based plans received benefits as if p = 0, and women in sex-based plans received benefits as if p = 1. The change to a unisex plan required that men and women receive benefits based on the actual value of p. Because the actual value of p is greater than zero, men experience a decrease in pension wealth and a m . This reduction in pension wealth will induce men to retire later. This is called the wealth effect. If leisure is a normal good (a good whose demand increases with wealth), a fall in pension wealth will induce men to retire later. This positive wealth effect is offset by a substitution effect. The substitution effect refers to changes in retirement that are induced by changes in the net wage. The substitution effect pushes men toward earlier retirement because the net wage of men falls when a unisex plan is adopted (because a m < 1). Recall that if the value of a, is less than one, the net wage declines when a unisex plan is adopted. A reduction in the net wage induces earlier retirement because an extra hour of leisure (priced at the net wage rate) is not as expensive. Under the new unisex plan men will substitute the relatively cheaper leisure for the relatively more expensive consumption of goods.
For women, the wealth and substitution effects (upon the adoption of a unisex plan) are the opposite of those for men. Because the actual value of p is less than one, women experience a decrease in p with the adoption of a unisex plan. Thus women receive an increase in pension wealth (inducing earlier retirement), and an increase in their net wage (inducing later retirement).
Estimating the Substitution and Wealth Effects
The argument is that when a unisex pension plan replaces a sex-based plan the overall impact on workers' retirement ages is ambiguous. The ambiguity derives from the fact that the substitution and wealth effects resulting from the change in pension plans are contrary to one another. In this section these effects are empirically estimated and the overall effect that a switch to a unisex pension plan has on the retirement decisions of men and women is determined.
The estimation procedure involves two steps. First, labor force participation equations are estimated for men and women to determine the wage and pension wealth elasticities. The elasticities are the percentage change in the probability of labor force participation resulting from a 1% increase in the independent variable. In the second step these coefficients are combined using a weighting procedure that uses information about the pension contribution rate, the proportion of women in the cohort, and the degree of actuarial fairness. Combining the elasticities in this way yields estimates of the percentage change in the probability of labor force participation resulting from the adoption of a unisex plan. For a more extensive explanation of this procedure see Cohmann and McClure (1985) .
Using data from the Longitudinal Retirement History Study for 1973, labor force participation equations were estimated separately for single men and women with a maximum likelihood logit procedure. Labor force participation was estimated as a function of education, race, the log of the wage rate, house value, assets, age, age squared, health index, social security benefits, social security eligibility, pension wealth, pension eligibility, disability, and welfare payments. The wage rate was imputed for those individuals out of the labor force. The wage equation was estimated as a function of tenure, age, government work dummy, education, race, and urban-rural dummies. Tests for sample selection bias indicated that it is not present in the wage equations.
The logit estimates yielded wage elasticities of 2.47 for men and 4.57 for women. These elasticities may be interpreted as follows: for men a 1% increase in the net wage results in a 2.47% increase in the probability of labor force participation; for women a 1% increase in the net wage results in a 4.57% increase in the probability of labor force participation. The pension wealth elasticities for men and women are -0.32 and-0.10.
The wage elasticities for labor force participation that appeared in the retirement literature generally applied to married men and were in most cases lower than the estimated elasticity for single men. Examples of these elasticities can be found in Boskin and Hurd (1978) , Burkhauser (1979) , and Clark and Johnson (1980) . The labor force participation specification was used to estimate a wage elasticity for married men of 1.81, which is close to Burkhauser's estimated pension acceptance elasticity.
The estimates of the percentage change in the probability of labor force participation resulting from switching to a unisex plan are presented in Table 2 . To obtain these estimates the sum of the wage and pension wealth elasticities were weighted, using a pension contribution rate of 7%, the degree of actuarial fairness calculated from the previous TIAA-CREF example, and the proportion of women in the cohort, as shown in Table 2 . For more detail on this weighting procedure see Gohmann and McClure (1985,1986) .
The interpretation of the results in Table 2 is straightforward. Consider, for example, a cohort where 3 out of every 10 workers are female (that is p = .3). The entry in the table is -0.6 for men and 3.1 for women. Shown by these values is that the switch to unisex plans, in such a cohort, reduces the probability of male labor force participation by 0.6% and increases the probability of female labor force participation by 3.1%. Shown by a more general inspection of the table is that the change in the probability of labor force participation for men declined from 0.0 (when p = 0) to -1.78 (when p = .9). These results are dependent upon the magnitude of the combined wage and pension wealth elasticities. Lower elasticities result in lower estimated labor force participation effects. For example, if the combined elasticities were half the size of the estimated value of 2.15, then the results shown in Table 2 would only be half as large.
Also shown in Table 2 is that the probability of participation for the entire cohort does not change much, even though the effect by sex is large. Given in column four of Table 2 is the weighted average of force participation of the cohort. For the cohort when p = 0.3, the overall effect on the probability of participation is 0.51. This implies that the adoption of the unisex plan results in an increase in labor force participation of this cohort by 0.51 percent. These changes in cohort participation rates differed from zero only because of the differences in the wage and pension wealth elasticities of men and women. If the elasticities were equal, the overall effect on the participation of the cohort would be zero, regardless of the proportion of women in the cohort.
To obtain a more realistic understanding of the effect of the unisex plan on the probability of labor force participation at age 65, the labor force participation response for TIAA-CREF age cohorts of 36-40, 41_45, 46-50, 51-55, and 56-60 was simulated. Data was used from TIAA-CREF for 1981 on the number of people remitting premiums during the year. Shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 are the total number of members and the number of females remitting premiums to TIAA-CREF in 1981. These numbers were used to calculate the proportion of women in each age cohort. These proportions are shown in column 4. The proportions range from 0.32 to 0.39, and increased as the cohorts aged. Presented in columns 5 and 6 are the calculated values of <x m and a w for each cohort. An initial retirement age of 65 was assumed and the remaining years of life were calculated as the difference between the 1981 life expectancy for the average cohort age and 65. These values of the coefficient of actuarial fairness were larger than those calculated in Table 1 because the number of years of life remaining after age 65 for these cohorts was lower and the difference between male and female life expectancies was higher. Shown in the last two columns is the predicted change in the probability of labor force participation for women and men at age 65 in these cohorts. The estimated elasticities, the values a w and a m , and a contribution rate of 7% are used in order to calculate the changes in the probability of participation. If members of the 36 to 40 yearold cohort make no adjustments to the type of fringe benefits they receive and no members take a joint and survivor option, then the predicted probability of labor force participation at age 65 will fall by 1.66% for men and rise by 7.34% for women. The results for the other age cohorts can be interpreted in a similar manner. For all cases in this example, the effect on the labor force participation of women is large relative to that of men because the proportion of women in the cohort is small.
Concluding Remarks
It has been shown how the implementation of a unisex pension plan, as a method of compliance with the Supreme Court's decisions, results in changes in benefits, pension wealth, and, hence, retirement ages of single men and women. The benefit paid to single men in a unisex plan, relative to their benefit in a sex-based plan, declines. For this reason men's pension wealth will decline with the adoption of a unisex plan. For single women, the benefit will rise and result in an increase in their pension wealth relative to the sex-based plan.
These changes affect both the worker's pension wealth and net wage rate. The net wage changes through a change in the degree of fairness of the pension plan. As a result of the adoption of the unisex plan, the degree of fairness for men falls below one. Men's net wage is thus reduced by the unisex plan because every dollar contributed to the plan results on average in less than a dollar return in the present value of benefits. For women the adoption of a unisex plan pushes the degree of actuarial fairness above one. This causes the female net wage and pension wealth to rise. Because the changes in the net wage and pension wealth produce conflicting incentives for workers making retirement decisions, conclusions about the adoption of unisex plans must be estimated empirically.
To determine the effect of a change in the retirement age resulting from the adoption of a unisex plan, the percentage change in the probability of labor force participation for men and women was estimated. Results indicated that women will retire later and men will retire earlier. The overall effect on the retirement age of the cohort, however, will be small.
